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APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF THE 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
HONORABLE RAYMOND S. UNO 
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS 
The Statements of Facts appearing in Appellant's Brief (at 
pp. 6-10) and Appellant's Reply Brief (at pages 1-2) set forth 
facts material to a consideration of the questions presented in 
this Petition for Rehearing. The following additional facts 
APPELLANT'S 
RESPONSE TO 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 890108 
Priority 14(b) 
are necessary to correct misleading statements of supposed fact 
appearing in Respondent's [sic] Petition for Rehearing, at 
pages 1 through 4, and to include facts omitted from that 
recitation: 
1. Commerce Financial has never sought to recover the 
full face amount of the construction note, $258,000.00. 
Rather, Commerce Financial has consistently sought, and contin-
ues to seek, to recover, with respect to that note, only those 
funds, which were actually disbursed to or on bcihalf of the 
appellees under that note, plus accrued interest thereon, 
$128,399.21 as of June 8, 1988 (Exhibit P-39). 
2. The $18,241.70, condominium-secured note (fact no. 5 
of Appellant's Brief) and the $20,000.00, unsecured note (fact 
no. 7 of Appellant's Brief) were demand promissory notes 
separate from the $258,000.00 construction loan note. Appel-
lees unquestionably received the full amounts set forth on the 
faces of those two notes. 
3. The trial court specifically found that appellees 
failed to seek alternate funding and that appellees' purported 
damages were too speculative. The trial court determined that 
no damages should be awarded to appellees. (R. at 509-510) 
4. Contrary to appellees' assertion that they no longer 
had the ability to seek alternate financing, the Memorandum 
Decision specifically states: "Because of his [Howard Hucks's] 
purported excellent credit rating, obtaining additional funding 
2 
appeared good." (R. at 509) Additionally, Markwest and Howard 
Hucks had a net worth of millions and millions of dollars 
(Exhibit P-42) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellees (petitioners, with respect to their pending 
request) did not appeal the trial court's determination that 
they were not entitled to recover damages. Such putative 
damages are, in any event, too speculative (as the trial court 
has recognized), and that issue cannot be raised for the first 
appellate time in a petition for rehearing. 
Commerce Financial is seeking only the principal balance 
actually disbursed under the construction promissory note, plus 
accrued interest (not the face amount of $258,000.00). The 
full face amounts of the condominium secured note and the 
unsecured $20,000.00 note were actually disbursed, and Commerce 
Financial seeks those full amounts plus interest accruing 
thereon. 
The case of Utah Farm Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Cox. 627 P.2d 
62 (Utah 1981), is controlling. Appellees were not entitled to 
an award of damages. Even if they were, which they are not, 
the trial court awarded them no damages. They did not appeal 
that determination. They are, accordingly, entitled to no 
offset against the amounts due under the notes. 
The notes are unambiguous. Extrinsic evidence regarding 
various "conditions and contingencies" cannot be considered. 
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Finally, the attorneys1 fees issue was reserved, by stipu-
lation, at the time of trial. On remand for entry of judgment, 
the amount of Commerce Financial's reasonable attorneyfs fee 
should be determined by the trial court. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE MATTERS DISCUSSED IN THE PETITION 
FOR REHEARING ARE RAISED FOR THE 
FIRST TIME AND SHOULD NOT BE 
CONSIDERED BY THIS COURT. 
Appellees request that this case be remanded to the trial 
court for a determination of the damages suffered by the 
appellees. The determination regarding that aspect of this 
case has, however, already been made by the trial court. Judge 
Uno found that appellees were not entitled to recover damages. 
(R. at 509-510) As Judge Uno stated: "Construction on the 
tract may have been a losing project, as many surmised and both 
parties saved money by discontinuing the project." (R. at 
510) Petitioners did not appeal that determincition of the 
trial court and failure to timely perfect an appeal is juris-
dictional. Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 676 
P.2d 455 (Utah 1984); Tracv v. Univ. of Utah Hosp.. 619 P.2d 
341, 342 (Utah 1980). Further, an argument not raised on 
appeal cannot be considered on rehearing. Wernbera v. State, 
519 P.2d 801, 804 (Alaska 1974); Cannon v. Tavlor, 88 Nev. 89, 
493 P.2d 1313, 1314 (1972); Vanek v. Kirbv, 253 Or. 494, 454 
P.2d 647 (1969). 
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Finally, the purpose of a petition for rehearing is to 
state "with particularity the points of law or fact which the 
petitioner claims the court has overlooked or misapprehended . 
. . ." Rule 35, Utah R. App. P. Appellees are, by raising all 
new issues in their Petition, in effect taking a second bite at 
the apple. Having failed to address the Cox case in their 
Respondents1 Brief and having failed to appeal the trial 
court's determination regarding their supposed damages, appel-
lees now seek to remedy those omissions under the naked guise 
of contending that there are points of law or fact which they 
claim this Court has overlooked or misapprehended. 
II 
COMMERCE FINANCIAL SEEKS ONLY TO 
RECOVER ON FUNDS ACTUALLY DISBURSED. 
At trial, Commerce Financial introduced three exhibits and 
oral testimony, all unrebutted, showing the amounts due under 
each note." Exhibit P-39, coupled with the testimony of Com-
merce Financial's Richard Abelhouzen, showed $128,399.21 as the 
amount due, as of June 8, 1988, under the construction note 
with a face value of $258,000.00. It is undisputed that the 
amounts disbursed under the construction loan, plus the full 
amounts of the two separate notes, were received by or paid on 
behalf of appellees. Commerce Financial seeks only to recover 
the benefit of what appellees actually received, not, as argued 
in the Petition for Rehearing, money never paid out. This 
applies to the two smaller notes, as well. 
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Ill 
THE HOLDING IN THE COX CASE 
PRECLUDES AN AWARD OF DAMAGES 
AS AN OFFSET. 
The trial court found that any damages claimed by appel-
lees were legally noncognizable, due to their speculative 
nature and the failure of appellees to seek alternative financ-
ing (a finding, as noted above, not appealed by appellees). 
Appellees argue, without citing any legal authority, that an 
element of reasonableness should be implied, and that the case 
should be remanded so that they might be allowed to put on 
evidence regarding the question of whether a reasonable person 
would have pursued alternate financing. The Cox case requires, 
however, that a borrower "actively seek alternative sources of 
financing." (Emphasis added.) Utah Farm Prod. Ass'n v. Cox, 
627 P.2d at 65. As Judge Uno noted in his Memorandum Decision, 
Howard Hucks testified that he and Markwest did not even 
attempt to find alternative financing for the project. (R. at 
501) 
Further, the defendant in Cox made a similar argument, 
claiming that he believed such exploration would be "futile." 
The Utah Supreme Court, rejecting that contention, stated: 
The argument is without merit. Had he 
sought alternative financing, defendant may 
well have been able to satisfy the debt in 
full, thereby rendering any threat of fore-
closure meaningless. Had he been able to 
secure even a lesser loan from an alterna-
tive source so as to demonstrate his good 
faith and desire to continue the turkey 
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business, he may have been able to stave 
off threat of foreclosure. . • . 
Id. at 65. 
Appellees1 assertion that alternative financing was not 
pursued because of their dire financial circumstances is, among 
other things, contrary to the findings of the trial court and 
the evidence adduced at trial. Judge Uno noted in his Memoran-
dum Decision that "[b]ecause of his [Howard Hucksfs] purported 
excellent credit rating, obtaining additional funding appeared 
good." (R. at 509) At the time the initial loan was made, 
less than a year prior to the cessation of disbursements under 
the construction loan, the assets of Markwest and Howard Hucks 
were represented to be over $6,000,000.00 and almost 
$7,000,000.00 respectively (Exhibit P-42, R. at 552). 
However, even if, as appellees propose, a standard of 
reasonableness is implied in the duty to seek alternative 
financing, appellees still are not entitled to setoff against 
the amounts due Commerce Financial. Judge Uno found that 
appellees had suffered no legally cognizable damages, a finding 
that has not been appealed and is now the law of the case. 
Tracv v. Univ. of Utah Hosp.. 619 P.2d at 342 (Utah 1980). 
IV 
THE NOTES ARE UNAMBIGUOUS. EXTRINSIC 
EVIDENCE OF "CONDITIONS AND 
CONTINGENCIES" CANNOT BE CONSIDERED. 
Appellees assert, in Point V of their Petition for Rehear-
ing, that this Court failed to consider "conditions and contin-
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gencies agreed to by the parties" and that findings were made 
by the trial court in that respect. Appellees fail, however, 
to specify what the supposed "conditions and contingencies" 
were and to identify the findings of the trial court relating 
thereto. 
In any event, the notes are unambiguous and have been 
treated as such by the parties and the trial court throughout 
the course of these proceedings. Only when an ambiguity exists 
which cannot be reconciled by an objective and reasonable 
interpretation of the contract may resort be had to the use of 
extrinsic evidence. Anderson v. Gardner, 647 P.2d 3, 4 (Utah 
1982) . Accordingly, any supposed "conditions and contingen-
cies" cannot be considered to alter the terms of the notes. 
V 
THE ISSUE OF ATTORNEYS1 FEES WAS 
RESERVED, BY STIPULATION, PENDING 
JUDGE UNO'S DECISION OF THE MERITS 
OF THIS CASE. 
Attorneys' fees, in Utah, are recoverable only in accor-
dance with the terms of the contract between the parties. 
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988). In 
this case, the notes provided for "costs and expenses incurred 
in the collection of this Note including reasonable attorney's 
X w w S . . . . 
Counsel for the parties stipulated, at trial, to reserve 
the issue of attorneys' fees pending the decision of Judge Uno. 
When the trial court ruled adversely to Commerce Financial, 
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concluding that Commerce Financial was not entitled to collect 
the sums due under the notes, it became unnecessary for the 
trial court to hear evidence as to the reasonable attorney's 
fee i ncurred by Commerce Financial, Since the decision of this 
Court holds that Commerce Financial is entitled to collect the 
amounts due, the trial court should, on remand for entry of 
judgment in favor of Commerce Financial, be directed to take 
evidence on the issue of the amount of Commerce Financial's 
reasonable attorney's fee. 
CONCLUSION 
Commerce Financial seeks only to recover the sums actually 
disbursed to or on behalf of appellees, plus i nterest thereon. 
The Cox case is controlling. Because appellees did not seek 
alternate financing, they are not entitled to damages, which, 
in any event, are too speculative. Appellees did not appeal 
the trial court's finding in this connection, either by initial 
appeal or cross-appeal. The notes are unambiguous Extrinsic 
evidence cannot be considered to aid in their interpretation. 
All of the issues in the Petition for Rehearing are raised for 
the first time and cannot be considered now by this Court. For 
all these reasons, Commerce Financial respectfully submits that 
the Petition for Rehearing should be denied, and that this case 
be remitted, without further ado, to the trial court, for entry 
of judgment in favor of Commerce Financial. 
9 
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